Comments on Heiddegger – Being and Time – Section #34
Despite Heiddegger’s best efforts to refrain from ending up with Da sein being existentialist in nature he fails, he during explaining language has to give some sort of means for language to project out of and thus adminst that ‘speaking forth’ or ‘saying’ have to come from a being, this is not an abstract concept as the point of origin for speech and language is ‘the being’ in its ‘disclosedness’ is after all an existential form.
Heiddeger then goes on to explain that having discourse or talking is equal to having a ‘state-of-mind’ as existing for the purposes of discourse thus placing both the concept of ‘to be’ and ‘being’ on the same level, not one before the other.
There are some concerns however that stem from Heiddeger’s breif description of disclosure, he claims that being silent and hearing are both possibilities of speech.
To this I would argue, you cannot say that the absence of something entails is presence. If a child is making alot of noise with pots and pans and yelling loudly, I cannot claim that they are in a state of silence as a means of communication because they are not silent, being silent is having the absence of speech or noise. It might be said that the individuals intent is to communicate but this form of communication or language is not discourse as it is the absence of communication originating from a being.
In Heiddegger’s description of communication, making assertions or giving information, being silent cannot be construed in any way to be this without knowing the context.